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Abstract
Social media sites are now becoming very impor-
tant platforms for product promotion or marketing
campaigns. Therefore, there is broad interest in de-
termining ways to guide a site to react more pos-
itively to a product with a limited budget. How-
ever, the practical significance of the existing stud-
ies on this subject is limited for two reasons. First,
most studies have investigated the issue in over-
simplified networks in which several important net-
work characteristics are ignored. Second, the opin-
ions of individuals are modeled as bipartite states
(e.g., support or not) in numerous studies, how-
ever, this setting is too strict for many real scenar-
ios. In this study, we focus on social trust networks
(STNs), which have the significant characteristics
ignored in the previous studies. We generalized a
famed continuous-valued opinion dynamics model
for STNs, which is more consistent with real sce-
narios. We subsequently formalized two novel
problems for solving the issue in STNs. More-
over, we developed two matrix-based methods for
these two problems and experiments on real-world
datasets to demonstrate the practical utility of our
methods.
1 Introduction
On social sites, users can express their opinions on a product,
a social event, or many other information items. By quanti-
fying opinions with numerical values, the overall opinion of
a network can be determined as the sum total of the opinions
of all individuals. This value reflects the emotional tendency
of the site toward an information item. Knowing the overall
opinion is critical for many economic and academic applica-
tions, such as marketing campaigns and public voice control.
For example, suppose that we are running a mobile phone
company and have just released a new phone. In order to
boost sales, it is vital to guide the market to react more posi-
tively (i.e., have a more positive overall opinion) to our prod-
uct with a limited budget. We call this issue opinion maxi-
mization. It is the general form of influence maximization [Li
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Figure 1: (a) A social trust network. (b) Graph representation of (a).
et al., 2018] and the main difference is that we consider opin-
ions in continuous-valued states rather than bipartite states,
which is too strict in many real scenarios.
Different from most existing studies on opinion or influ-
ence maximization [Chen et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2016;
Abebe et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018], we argue that it is more
realistic and valuable to study this issue in a social trust net-
work (STN, see Figure 1), which models the individuals and
the trust or distrust relationships between them and can be
represented by a directed signed weighted graph [Kumar et
al., 2016; Xu et al., 2019]. The main reason for this is the
fact that the following three important network characteris-
tics have usually not been reflected in the target networks of
the existing studies simultaneously.
• A lot of normal users tend to be influenced by key opin-
ion leaders (KOLs), but KOLs are hardly influenced by
normal users. This characteristic is reflected in the di-
rectionality of STNs.
• Users can be influenced by others to varying degrees and
this characteristic is reflected in the absolute weights of
edges in STNs.
• Relationships between users may have opposite polari-
ties. This characteristic is reflected in the signs of the
edges’ weights in STNs.
Given the target networks, we need to model how opinions
of individuals form, then we can design strategies to maxi-
mize the overall opinion. Therefore, we have chosen to gen-
eralize a famed continuous-valued opinion dynamics model
[Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990] for STNs for three reasons:
• Opinions cannot be accurately modeled by discrete
states, such as being absolutely supportive or opposed,
in many real scenarios. For example, one may give a
little support or strong support to a new iPhone.
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• Opinion dynamics better resembles a social game in
which individuals constantly influence each other rather
than a discrete cascading process [Gionis et al., 2013].
• In addition to the trust relationships, distrust relation-
ships also play an important role in opinion dynamics
[Li et al., 2013; Li et al., 2017]. But they are usually
ignored in existing studies of opinion dynamics.
As an STN has several complex network characteristics
and the opinion dynamics model used is more realistic and
complex, opinion maximization becomes much more diffi-
cult in STNs. Therefore, existing studies are not applicable
for STNs. In this study, we formalize two novel problems for
solving opinion maximization in STNs. They are, with a lim-
ited budget, how to maximize the overall opinion by changing
internal opinions of some people (IOP) or by fixing the ex-
pressed opinions of some people (EOP). In IOP, we observe
that people play different roles in the social game, i.e., their
internal opinions contribute differently to the overall opinion.
This phenomenon is not observed in oversimplified networks.
In addition, we define a novel contribution index to quan-
tify the contribution ability, then design a simple but effective
method for IOP. The expressed opinion problem is NP-hard,
hence we design a greedy method to achieve an acceptable
solution. Iteratively calculating the benefit of fixing a node’s
expressed opinion is time-consuming, but we integrate the
calculations into a simple expression via crafty matrix op-
erations. That makes our method efficient. We evaluate our
methods on several real-world datasets and the experimental
results demonstrate the practical utility of the proposed meth-
ods. The contributions of this study can be summarized as
follows.1
• This is the first study that investigates opinion maxi-
mization in STNs with a continuous-valued opinion dy-
namics model. We formalize two novel problems, IOP
and EOP, for maximizing the overall opinion of an STN.
• We define a novel contribution index to quantify the
nodes’ variant contribution abilities to the overall opin-
ion, which are unobserved in oversimplified networks.
We also develop a simple method for IOP that can easily
achieve optimal performance.
• We prove the hardness of EOP. By integrating the vast
computation via crafty matrix operations, we develop an
efficient method for EOP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The prelimi-
naries include an explanation of our notation and the opinion
dynamics model is described in Section 2. The problems and
the proposed methods are presented in Section 3. Section 4
details the experiments, followed by the conclusions in Sec-
tion 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
A social trust network is represented by a directed signed
weighted graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes
1The implementations of the methods are available at
https://github.com/WHU-SNA/OpMaxInSTN
and E is the set of edges. Each directed edge from i to j,
(i, j) ∈ E , is associated with the weight wij ∈ [−1, 1], which
signifies the strength of the relationship. Let A denote the ad-
jacency matrix of G, where aij = wij if (i, j) ∈ E , aij = 0
otherwise. Let D denote the row connectivity matrix, where
dii =
∑
j |aij |. Then L¯ = D − A denotes the generalized
Laplacian matrix [Hu and Zheng, 2013].
Lemma 1 Inequality 0 ≤ min sp(L¯u) ≤ Re(sp(L¯)) ≤
max sp(L¯u), where L¯u = (L¯+L¯
T )/2, sp(∗) indicates the spec-
tra and Re(∗) indicates the real parts.
Theorem 1 The term (L¯+ I) is invertible, where I is identity
matrix.
Proof Denote the eigenvalues of L¯ as {k1, k2, ..., k|V|} and
the corresponding eigenvectors as {x1, x2, ..., x|V|}. Then,
we have the following derivation:
(L¯ + I)xi = L¯xi + xi = (ki + 1)xi
Hence, the eigenvalues of (L¯ + I) are {k1 + 1, k2 +
1, ..., k|V| + 1}. According to lemma 1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ |V|,
Re(ki) ≥ 0. Therefore, the real parts of all the eigenvalues
of (L¯ + I) are greater than 1, det(L¯ + I) 6= 0, and (L¯ + I) is
invertible.
2.2 Friedkin-Johnsen Model
The Friedkin–Johnsen model [Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990]
is a famed continuous-valued opinion dynamics model. In
this model, each node i ∈ V holds a fixed internal opinion
si, which remains constant. During each iteration, node i
updates its expressed opinion zi as follows:
zi =
si+
∑
j∈N (i) wijzj
1+
∑
j∈N (i) wij
(1)
where N (i) denotes the successors of i. The values of si
and zi are in the interval [−1, 1], where −1/1 signifies the
strongest positive/negative opinion. The repeated averag-
ing does converge to the Nash equilibrium of a social game
[Bindel et al., 2015].
2.3 Generalized Opinion Dynamics Model For
Social Trust Networks
As relationships with opposite polarities in STNs are now
considered, we generalize the social game of the Fried-
kin–Johnsen model according to structural balance theory [Is-
lam et al., 2018]. Specifically, an individual is supposed
to express the opposite opinions of the people she distrusts.
Hence the consensus cost function of the social game is:
c(zi) = (zi − si)2 +
∑
j∈N (i) |wij |(zi − sgn(i, j)zj)2
where sgn(i, j) denotes the sign of nonzero wij . Accord-
ingly, the repeated averaging process becomes:
zi =
si+
∑
j∈N (i) wijzj
1+
∑
j∈N (i) |wij |
(2)
Proposition 1 Let s denote the internal opinion vector,
whose i-th component is si, and z∗ denote the expressed opin-
ion vector at the Nash equilibrium. Equation (2) is solved by
the equilibrium z∗ = (L¯ + I)−1s.
Proof At the Nash equilibrium, each node i adopts an ex-
pressed opinion z∗i that minimizes its cost, which implies that
c′(z∗i ) = 0.
c′(z∗i ) = 2(z
∗
i − si) + 2
∑
j∈N (i) |wij |(z∗i − sgn(i, j)z∗j ) = 0
⇒ z∗i =
si+
∑
j∈N (i) wijz
∗
j
1+
∑
j∈N (i) |wij |
(3)
Therefore, the Nash equilibrium opinion of a node is the
weighted average of its internal opinion, the Nash equilib-
rium opinions of the nodes it trusts, and the opposite Nash
equilibrium opinions of the nodes it distrusts. We rewrite
equation (3) as:
(1 +
∑
j∈N (i) |wij |)z∗i = si +
∑
j∈N (i) wijz
∗
j
By introducing the opinion vectors s and z∗, we can for-
malize equation (3)’s matrix form as:
(D + I)z∗ = s + Az∗ ⇒ (D− A + I)z∗ = s
⇒ (L¯ + I)z∗ = s
According to Theorem 1, (L¯ + I) is invertible. Therefore,
we obtain that z∗ = (L¯ + I)−1s.
Given the generalized opinion dynamics model for STNs,
we adopt a similar definition of overall opinion introduced in
[Gionis et al., 2013].
Definition 1 (Overall opinion). The overall opinion p(z∗) of
an STN is the sum of the expressed opinions at Nash equilib-
rium:
p(z∗) =
∑
i z
∗
i = ~1
T
(L¯ + I)−1s
where ~1 is a column vector of ones.
3 Opinion Maximization in Social Trust
Networks
In this section, we formalize IOP and EOP for solving opin-
ion maximization in STNs, and we develop two methods for
IOP and EOP, respectively. Figure 2 illustrates that we can in-
crease the overall opinion by changing a node’s internal opin-
ion or by fixing a node’s expressed opinion.
3.1 Internal Opinion Problem
In IOP, we seek to change the internal opinions of some nodes
to specific values, such that the overall opinion is maximized.
Our decision is limited by a budget µ on the total modifica-
tion of internal opinions. Let ∆s denote the modification of
the internal opinions and the formal problem definition is the
following.
Definition 2 (Internal Opinion Problem). Given a social
trust network G, the internal opinion vector s, and the bud-
get amount µ, seek out the modification of internal opinions
∆s, such that the overall opinion p(z∗) is maximized:
max
∆s
~1
T
(L¯ + I)−1(s + ∆s)
s.t.
{−1 ≤ si + ∆si ≤ 1 (i = 1, 2, 3, · · · , |V|)
‖∆s‖1 ≤ µ
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Figure 2: Subfigure (a) illustrates the opinion dynamics in an STN.
The values on the nodes indicate the expressed opinions, and the val-
ues close to the edges indicate the weights. Note that the expressed
opinion of a node equals its internal opinion at the initial state. We
can increase the overall opinion by (b) changing the internal opinion
of a node or (c) by fixing the expressed opinion of a node.
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Figure 3: Example of the contribution index.
According to Proposition 1, the expressed opinion vector
is in the column space of (L¯ + I)−1 and the coordinates are
stored in the vector of internal opinions. Then, we refer to
g = (~1
T
(L¯ + I)−1)T as the contribution index vector. As
p(z∗) = ~1
T
(L¯ + I)−1s = gT s, each entry gi indicates the
amount by which the node i’s internal opinion contributes to
the overall opinion. Formally, the contribution index is de-
fined as follows.
Definition 3 (Contribution index). The contribution index gi
of node i indicates how i’s internal opinion contributes to the
overall opinion and is quantified by:
gi = (~1
T
(L¯ + I)−1)Ti
In Figure 3, we demonstrate some examples of the con-
tribution index. For simplicity, the edge weight is set to +1
or −1. From (a)(b), we observe that a node, which receives
more trusts from other nodes, has a larger contribution in-
dex. Subfigures (a)(c) illustrate that a KOL has more impact
on the overall opinion than normal users. The target node
in (d) has a negative contribution index, as it promotes the
nodes who distrust it to adapt the opposite of its expressed
opinion. In subfigure (e), the target node is trusted by a node
and distrusted by another. The combined effects of the rela-
tionships with opposite signs result in a contribution index of
Algorithm 1: Solving internal opinion problem
Input: A social trust network G = (V, E), internal
opinions s, and budget µ.
Output: The modification ∆s.
Initialize ∆s to null vector;
while µ > 0 do
Find the component gi with the largest absolute
value;
if gi = 0 then
break;
sign = gi/|gi|; cost = 1− sign · si;
if cost > µ then
∆si = sign · µ; break;
else
∆si = sign · cost; µ = µ− cost;
1. Subfigure (f) shows the contribution indices of nodes in a
hierarchical network structure.
By changing the internal opinion of the node with the
largest absolute value of the contribution index, we can get
the most benefit at the same budget. Our method SIOP is
summarized in Algorithm 1. Further, we proof that Algo-
rithm 1 outputs the optimal solution of IOP.
Theorem 2 Algorithm 1 outputs the optimal solution of IOP.
Proof Given the output of Algorithm 1, the benefit is gT∆s.
For any intervened node i, we can adjust the corresponding
modification ∆si to (∆si − ν) if ∆si > 0, or (∆si + ν)
otherwise, where ν > 0 is very slight perturbation. We then
have unused budget ν. By changing the internal opinion of
node j, which is not intervened before, the benefit becomes
gT∆s + (|gj | − |gi|)ν. According to the procedure of Algo-
rithm 1, |gj | ≤ |gi|, thus gT∆s ≥ gT∆s + (|gj | − |gi|)ν.
Remark IOP may have multiple optimal solutions.
3.2 Expressed Opinion Problem
Suppose that we can fix the expressed opinions of some nodes
to their internal opinions during the opinion formation pro-
cess. The chosen nodes will then never be affected by the
expressed opinions of their neighbors. In EOP, we try to find
a set of nodes U ∈ V . For each node i in U , we fix its ex-
pressed opinion, such that the overall opinion is maximized.
Let p(z∗|U) denote the overall opinion after fixing the ex-
pressed opinion of nodes in U and the formal problem defini-
tion is the following.
Definition 4 (Expressed opinion problem). Given a social
trust network G, the internal opinion vector s, and an integer
µ, seek a set U of µ nodes and fix zi to si for i ∈ U , such that
p(z∗|U) is then maximized.
Theorem 3 EOP is NP-hard.
Proof Due to lack of space, we only sketch the proof here.
Our proof follows the idea in [Gionis et al., 2013]. We
generalized the absorbing random walk for STNs, then con-
structed a reduction from the problem of vertex cover on reg-
ular graphs.
Given the hardness of EOP, we designed a greedy algo-
rithm to achieve an acceptable solution. The algorithm starts
with an empty set U0, and extends U (t−1) by adding a node
i ∈ V \U (t−1) in the t-th iteration, such that the benefit to the
overall opinion p(z∗|U (t−1)∪i)−p(z∗|U (t−1)) is maximized.
In the first iteration, we successively calculate the benefit of
fixing the expressed opinion of each node i in V . Note that
from the view of linear algebra, fixing i’s expressed opinion
is equivalent to replacing the i-th row of A with a row vector
of zeros. And the row connectivity changes accordingly.
Let Q = (L¯+ I)−1 denote the fundamental matrix, QU de-
note the fundamental matrix after fixing the expressed opin-
ions of nodes in U . Obviously, QU0 = Q. According to
Theorem 4, we compute QU
0∪i (equals to Q{i}) using the
Sherman–Morrison formula:
Q{i} = ((L¯ + I) + (−eili:))−1 = Q + Qeili:Q
1− li:Qei
where ei is the unit vector, whose i-th component is 1, and
li: is the i-th row of L¯. In the t-th iteration, the fundamental
matrix after fixing the expressed opinion of i ∈ V \ U (t−1)is
the following:
QU
t−1∪i = QU
t−1
+
QU
t−1
eili:QU
t−1
1− li:QUt−1ei
(4)
Theorem 4 The term X = (L¯ + I) + (−eili:) is invertible.
Proof Expand X along the i-th row and we find:
det(X) =
∑|V|
j=1(−1)i+jxijMij = (−1)i+iMii = Mii
where Mij is the minor of X. Denote the Laplacian matrix of
sub-graph without node i as L¯′, then we have:
Mii = det(L¯
′
+ I + C)
where C ∈ R(|V|−1)×(|V|−1) is a diagonal matrix, and cjj =
|aji| for j < i and c(j−1)(j−1) = |a(j−1)i| for j > i. Like
the proof of Theorem 1, we find Re(sp(L¯′ + I + C)) ≥ 1.
Therefore, det(L¯′+I+C) 6= 0. As det(X) = Mii = det(L¯′+
I + C), the term X is invertible.
Thus, the benefit of fixing the expressed opinion of i in the
t-th iteration is:
~1
T
(QU
t−1∪i −QUt−1)s = ~1T Q
Ut−1eili:QU
t−1
1− li:QUt−1ei
s (5)
We first calculate the term eili:QU
t−1
through:
eili:QU
t−1
= ei((li: + eTi )− eTi )QU
t−1
=ei(QU
t−1
)−1i: Q
Ut−1 − eieTi QU
t−1
= ei(eTi −QU
t−1
i: )
This result illustrates that eili:QU
t−1
is the matrix whose
only non-negative row is the i-th row. And its i-th row is the
negative QU
t−1
i: with the addition of one in the i-th entry.
Then, we calculate the term li:QU
t−1
ei through:
li:QU
t−1
ei = ((li: + eTi )− eTi )QU
t−1
ei
=(eTi −QU
t−1
i: )ei = 1− qU
t−1
ii
Algorithm 2: Solving expressed opinion problem
Input: A social trust network G = (V, E), internal
opinions s, and budget µ.
Output: The node set U , in which the node’s expressed
opinion will be fixed.
Initialize U to empty set; t = 0;
while t < µ do
t = t+ 1;
Calculate the benefits b of fixing nodes’ expressed
opinions via equation (7);
for i in V − U t−1 do
if i == 1 then
candidate = i;
else if bi > bcandidate then
candidate = i;
U t = U t−1 ∪ candidate;
Update QU
t
via equation (4);
Thus, we rewrite equation (5) as:
~1
T
(QU
t−1∪i −QUt−1)s = ~1T Q
Ut−1ei(eTi −QU
t−1
i: )
1− (1− qUt−1ii )
s
=
(gU
t−1
)T ei(si − zUt−1∗i )
qUt−1ii
=
gU
t−1
i
qUt−1ii
(si − zUt−1∗i )
(6)
where we denote gU
t−1
= (~1
T
QU
t−1
)T as the contribution
index vector after fixing the expressed opinions of nodes in
U t−1. For convenience, we denote that zUt−1∗ = (z∗|U t−1).
Based on equation (6), we integrate the calculation for each
node into a simple expression:
b = diag(gU
t−1
)(diag(QU
t−1
))−1(s− zUt−1∗) (7)
where the i-th component of b indicates the benefit of fix-
ing the expressed opinion of the i-th node and the operation
diag(∗) expands a vector to a diagonal matrix or reverses the
diagonal entries of a matrix. By using equation (7), we re-
duce the computational cost from O(|V|3) to O(|V|2), and
this makes our SEOP method (see Algorithm 2) efficient.
Equation (7) also constructs the relations between EOP, the
fundamental matrix, and internal conflict [Chen et al., 2018],
which may help to enable the analysis of simultaneous opin-
ion maximization and conflict reduction in future works.
4 Experiments
In this section, we describe a series of experiments that were
conducted to evaluate the proposed methods. We first intro-
duce the datasets, the experimental setup, and then the exper-
imental results for IOP and EOP, respectively.
4.1 Datasets
The real-world social trust networks used in the experiments
are the following: (i) Alpha and (ii) OTC [Kumar et al., 2016;
Kumar et al., 2018]. We normalized the trust values (i.e.,
edge weights) to the interval [−1, 1]. Moreover, we also
tested our methods on Elec [Leskovec et al., 2010b; Leskovec
et al., 2010a] and Rfa [West et al., 2014], as the relationships
in these two networks are closely related to trust. The statis-
tical details of these networks can be found in SNAP.2
4.2 Experimental Setup
To simulate different situations, we randomly sampled val-
ues, which obey specific distributions, to initialize the inter-
nal opinion vector s. More precisely, for each network, we
used five sets of internal opinions. (i) The internal opinions
follow a uniform distribution (i.e., s ∼ U(−1, 1)). (ii) The
internal opinions follow a standard normal distribution (i.e.,
s ∼ N(0, 1)). (iii) The absolute values of the internal opin-
ions follow power-law distributions with α = 1 and α = 2
(i.e., |s| ∼ Pow(1) and |s| ∼ Pow(2)), and each entry of s is
negated with a probability of 0.5. (iv) The internal opinion of
a node positively correlates to that node’s column connectiv-
ity (i.e., si ∝
∑
j |aji|), and each entry of s is negated with a
probability of 0.5.
4.3 Comparative Methods
To the best of our knowledge, existing methods cannot solve
IOP and EOP in STNs. For comparison, we modified the
heuristics used in the existing studies.
For IOP, we consider four heuristics. (i) Rand [Li et al.,
2013]. We randomly sort the nodes. (ii) Trust. This is
slightly modified from the heuristics in [Chen et al., 2015].
We define the trust sum of a node as the sum of the corre-
sponding column of the adjacency matrix. The node with
large trust sum may have a strong ability to influence other
nodes with their opinions. Therefore, we sort the nodes in de-
scending order of their trust sum. (iii) IO. This was inspired
by [Musco et al., 2018]. The overall opinion may increase if
we can convince the people with negative internal opinions to
have positive internal opinions. Therefore, we sort the nodes
in ascending order of their internal opinions. (iv) EO. This
was inspired by [Chen et al., 2018]. We sort the nodes in as-
cending order of their expressed opinions. After sorting the
nodes, we change their internal opinions to 1 in order.
For EOP, we consider three heuristics. (i) Rand. (ii) IO.
We do not consider EO in EOP, as the expressed opinion of
the intervened node definitely equals its internal opinion. (iii)
IOTS. This is a variation of ”RWR” in [Gionis et al., 2013].
We consider comprehensively the internal opinion and the
trust sum. More precisely, we sort the nodes in descending
order of the product of the internal opinion and trust sum.
After sorting, we fix the nodes’ expressed opinions in order.
4.4 Solving Internal Opinion Problem
We evaluated our method for solving IOP and the results are
reported in Table 1. Our method SIOP has an overwhelm-
ing advantage compared to the heuristic methods, as SIOP
can achieve the optimal solution. The benefit of Rand is sup-
posed to be µ||g||1/|V|, therefore Rand can achieve good per-
formance if the contribution index distribution is dense. The
2http://snap.stanford.edu/data/
Dataset
Avg
benefit
of SIOP
SIOP
vs
Rand
SIOP
vs
Trust
SIOP
vs
IO
SIOP
vs
EO
Alpha 273.2 1.66× 2.53× 3.41× 2.55×
OTC 307.7 1.91× 3.05× 3.23× 2.32×
Elec 589.9 3.63× > 10× 2.97× 2.21×
Rfa 981.0 > 10× > 10× 8.61× 3.96×
Table 1: Experimental results on IOP.
UniformS NormS PowAlpha1S PowAlpha2S DegreeS
UniformS NormS PowAlpha1S PowAlpha2S DegreeS
OTC
Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha Alpha
OTC OTC OTC OTC
UniformS NormS
Alpha Alpha
PowAlpha1S
OTC
DegreeS
OTC
Figure 4: A part of the performance curves of SIOP. The x-axis
shows the budget amount, the left y-axis shows the overall opinion,
and the right y-axis shows the unit benefit.
Trust method is not competitive with the other heuristic meth-
ods, as the trust sum is not the only determinant in contribu-
tion index. Actually, a node that has a high contribution index
must not be influenced by many other nodes.
A part of the performance curves of SIOP, which can rep-
resent the overall performance, are shown in Figure 4. We
observe that different internal opinions result in very differ-
ent initial overall opinions, but our method always found the
best solutions in different situations. As expected, the rate
of overall opinion growth decreased as the amount of modi-
fied internal opinions increased. This is because our method
preferentially modifies the internal opinion of the node with
the largest absolute value of contribution index in each itera-
tion. And a greater change in the overall opinion is achieved
when modifying the internal opinion of the node with a larger
absolute value of contribution index.
4.5 Solving Expressed Opinion Problem
We then evaluated our method for solving EOP. From the ex-
perimental results in Table 2, we observe that our method
still has an overwhelming advantage over the heuristic meth-
ods. Rand performs badly in EOP, as only a few nodes are
worth intervening to get a high benefit, but it is difficult to
select out these nodes by a random heuristic. Compared to
IO, IOTS is a competitive heuristic method, as it considers
the internal opinion and trust sum simultaneously. But there
is a big gap between SEOP and IOTS, because the high-order
network structure is also closely related to the benefit of fix-
ing the expressed opinion of a node, except for the trust sum
based on 1st-order structure.
A part of performance curves of SEOP, which can represent
the overall performance, are shown in Figure 5. We observe
that in all the datasets, we can fix the expressed opinions of a
few users to get very large benefits on the overall opinion. But
with increasing iterations, the benefit of fixing the expressed
opinion of a user declines quickly at first, and then slowly.
We also compare the running time of SEOP and SEOP
Dataset
Avg
benefit
of SEOP
SEOP
vs
Rand
SEOP
vs
IO
SEOP
vs
IOTS
Alpha 192.1 > 10× 4.99× 1.30×
OTC 220.6 > 10× 5.47× 1.86×
Elec 65.2 > 10× 4.50× 2.87×
Rfa 314.9 > 10× 6.92× 3.66×
Table 2: Experimental results on EOP.
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Figure 5: A part of the performance curves of SEOP.
Alpha OTC Elec Rfa
SEOP 13.1ms 31.1ms 43.9ms 93.9ms
Non-optimized
SEOP 4.7k× 7.3k× > 10k× > 10k×
Table 3: Comparison of running time (of each iteration).
without optimization (see Table 3).3 Note that the number of
iterations equals the number of nodes whose expressed opin-
ions are fixed. In the largest network Rfa, the total running
time of SEOP is about 19s (µ = 200). It is clear that the
integration of vast calculations makes our method efficient.
5 Conclusion
In this study, we formalized two novel problems for opin-
ion maximization in social trust networks and proposed two
matrix-based methods to solve these problems. In the inter-
nal opinion problem, we observed that nodes play very differ-
ent roles in the social game. We defined the contribution in-
dex, with which we could easily achieve the optimal solution.
For the expressed opinion problem, we proved its hardness
and designed a greedy method to achieve an acceptable solu-
tion. We were able to integrate a vast number of calculations
by crafty matrix operations to create an efficient method. In
real-world applications, we may have to consider numerator
factors to calculate the cost of a modification, but this can be
easily combined with our methods.
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